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Question No.1: 
FINAL EXAMINATION 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
FIRST S E M EST E R 1969 - 1970 
Alabama. together with every other state, participates in the Federal 
Government's aid to fatherless families with dependent children (AFDC) 
program which was established by the Social Security Act of 1935. as amended. 
The Social Security Act provides that participating states must grant ap-
plicants for AFDC payments who are denied aid "an opportunity for a fair 
hearing before the State agency. ", The Department of Pensions and 
Security of Alabama had adopted regulations providing for administrative 
review of such denials. 
In June 1964 the Department of Pensions and Security of Alabama put into 
effect a socalled "substitute father'! regulation which denied AFDC payment 
to children of a mother who "cohabits" in or outside her home with any 
single or married man. 
As justification for the regulation the Dapartment of Pensions and Security 
of Alabama asserted: (1) It discouraged illicit sexual relationships and il-
legitimate births. (2) In addition, puts families in which there is an illicit 
extra marital relationship on the par with those in which there is a legal marital 
relationship. because families of the latter class are not eligible for AFDC as-
sistance. 
The evidence showed that between June 1964, when the regulation 
became effective in January 196 7 the total number of AFDC recipients in 
the state declined by about 20,000 persons, and the number of children 
recipients by 16,000, or 22%. 
Mrs. Sylvester Smith and her four children, ages 14, 12, 11 and 9 
reside in Dallas County, Alabama. For several years prior to October 1, 
1966, they had received aid under the AFDC program. By notice dated 
October 11, 1966 they were removed from the list of persons eligible to re-
ceive such aid. This action is taken by the Dallas County Welfare authorities 
pursuant to the "substitute father" regulation, on the ground that a M r. Will-
iams regularly came to her home on week ends and had sexual relations 
with her. Mr. Williams, who was thus clas sified as a "substitute father" 
of Mrs. Smith's children, had nine children of his own and lived with his 
wife except on week ends. 
Subsequent to the termination of AFDC payment s :Mrs. Smith and her 
four children lived on Mrs. Smith's salary of between $1 (;. and $20 per week 
which she earned working from 3:30 a. m. to 12 noon as a cook and waitress. 
Shortly after receiving the notice of termination of AFDC payments 
Mrs. Smith bought a class action against the officers and members of the 
Alabama Board of Pensions and Security in the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Alabama, under 42 USC §l983, seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief. 
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A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case. 
In her complaint !vl rs. Smith alleged that the "substitute father" regu-
lation violated the equal protection clause of the four t eenth amendment of 
the Cons t itution of the United States and also violated the Social Security Act. 
Should the Court adjudicate these substantive constitutional questions, and 
for what reasons? 
Question No.2: 
A holding company which controlled both an integrated electric utility . 
system was ordered by the Securities Exchange Commission to divest itself 
of the gas utility system. § 11 (B) (1) of the Public Ut ility Holding .company 
Act of 1935 provides that a holding company is to be limited in operation by 
the Commission "to a single integrated public-utility system", unless the 
Commission finds that an additional system cannot be operated as an inde-
pendent system "without the loss of substantial economies which can be 
secured by retention of control by such holding company of such system. " 
The holding company brought proceedings in the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit under § 24 (A) of the Act for review of the Commission's divest-
ment order, as s e rting the following gr ounds : 
1. The Commission's construction of the term "loss of substantial 
economies" in the A ct was incorrect and in violation of the Act. 
2. That the Commission's order of divestment was not supported 
by the evidence of record, and that the Commission's opinion 
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did not reveal any application of both reason and experience to the 
facts which would merit endorsement by the Court as a responsible 
exercise of administrative expertise. 
To what extent should the Court review the Commission's divestment 
order and for what reasons? 
Question No.3: 
Banks in Texas applied to the Comptroller of the Currency for approval 
of bank mergers in those states pursuant to the Bank Merger Act of 196 6 . 
Although the Attorney General and the Federal Reserve System both submitted 
adverse reports to the mergers, the Comptroller approved them. The United 
States filed Civil suits under § 7 of the Clayton Act in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking to prevent the mergers. 
The Comptroller intervened in the suit. 
The Bank Merger Act of 1966 (12) USC § 1828 (C) provides that the Comp-
troller shall not approve a bank merger with anticompetitive effects unless he 
finds that such effects are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the 
probably effect of the transaction in meeting community convenience and need. 
The Act also provides that the Court in an anti-trust action involving the bank 
mergers "shall review de novo the issues presented." 
The Comptroller's action in approving the merger was informal, no hear-
ings having been held, and none being required by the Bank Merger Act. 
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In these suits it was contended that under the proper construction of the 
Bank Merger Act the banks had the burden of proof to establish that the merger 
is within the statutory exception that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed 
transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect 
of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be 
served. It was also contended that under the provision in the Bank Merger Act 
that the Court "shall review de novo the issues presented" the Court should 
make an independent determination of the factual issues involved in whether 
the challenged bank merger should be approved under the standards set 
forth in the Act and should not in any way be bound by or required to give any 
special weight to the determination of the Comptroller. 
What is the proper scope of review to be accorded by the Court in this 
case and for what reasons? 
'~uestion No.4: 
The Toilet Goods Association, Inc. an organization of cosmetics manu-
facturers accounting for some 90% of annual American sales in this field, 
and 39 individual cosmetic manufacturers and distributors brought this suit 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary of Health 
Education and Welfare and the Commissioner of Food and Drugs on the ground 
that certain regulations promulgated by the Commissioner exceeded his 
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statutory authority under the Color Additive Amendments to the Federal 
Food and Drug Cosmetic Act (USC §§321-37 6 ). 
The regulation in issue broadens the authority of the Commissioner to 
control the ingredients added to foods, drugs and cosmetics that impart 
color to them. 
The Commissioner of Food and Drugs, exercising power delegated by 
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, under statutory authority 
lito promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of the Act, is-
sued the following regulation after due public notice (26 Reg. 679) and con-
sideration of comments submitted by interested parties: 
"(a) When it appears to the Commissioner that a person has: 
(4) Refused to permit duly authorized employees of the Food 
and Drug Administration free access to all manufacturing 
facilities, proces ses, and formulae involved in the manu-
facture of color additives and intermediates from which 
such color additives are derived; he may immediately suspend 
certification service to such person and may continue such 
suspension until adequate correctiT/ e action has been taken." 
The certification service referred to was the certification by the 
Commissioner of the color additives used by the cosmetic manufacturers. 
Immediately after this regulation was issued and became effective the 
plaintiff filed this suit. 
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In this posture in the matter what is the proper scope of review, if 
any t by the District Court, and for what reasons? 
Question No.5: 
In 1966 oral arguments in proceedings before the Federal Trade Com-
mission for alleged violations of certain provisions of the Robinson-Patman 
Act were heard by the full Commission of five members. However , two 
Commissioners retired before the decision and a new Commissioner, ap-
pointed to fill one of the vacancies, declined to participate in the decision 
because he had not heard the oral argument. A cease and desist order was 
entered concurred in by only two of the participating Commissioners. 
On petition for review of the Commission's cease and desist order 
filed in the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit it was conten<i'ed that the 
order was invalid and unenforceable because it was concurred in by only two 
of the total of five Commissioners. 
The Federal Trade Commission Act does not specify the number of 
Commissioners who may constitute a quorum. By rule of the Commission 
first adopted in 1915 it is provided: 
"A majority of the members of the Commission constitute a 
quorum for the transaction of business. " 
How should the Court rule on the question of the validity and enforce-
ability of the Commission 's order, and for what reasons? 
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Question No.6: 
The Selective Service Act (USC Appex § 456 (j) provides that in the 
case of an adverse ruling by a local draft board on a registrants claim for 
draft exemption as a conscientious objector, the registrant may appeal to an 
Appeal Board. The Act requires that on such an appeal the Department of 
Justice, after appropriate inquiry, is required to hold a hearing and there-
after to make a recommendation to the Board as to the registrants inducti-
bility. 
The petitioner registered under the Selective Service Laws in 1948. At 
that time, he did not claim to be a minister or a conscientious objector, but 
stated that he believed his classification should be lAo The local Board so 
classified him. In 1951 he was given a dependency deferment which was termi-
nated on October 22, 1951, thereby restoring him to a IP. classification. Within 
a week after his restoration to IA classification petitioner filed a special 
form for conscientious objectors claiming exemption from combat and non-
combat service. The petitioner stated that in December 1950 he had become an 
unordained minister in the Jehoyah's Witnesses religious sect, and had become 
an ordained minister in October 1951; that he preached from house to house and 
on the streets, giving public expression to his conscientious objections to war. 
The local Board continued him in a lA classification and petitioner filed 
an appeal. The Appeal Board referred the case to the Department of Justice 
under the Act for appropriate inquiry and hearing and subsequent recommenda-
to the Board. 
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At the hearing the petitioner requested that he be advised as to the 
general nature and character of any adverse evidence in the FBI report 
on him. According to petitioner's uncontradicted testimony. the hearing 
officer told him that the FBI report disclosed that he had been hanging 
around pool rooms and petitioner denied this. Petitioner asked what else 
was in the report and the hearing officer changed the subject. At the hearing 
the hearing officer asked petitioner's wife how she was feeling and how peti-
tioner was treating her. Her reply was, "fine". 
The hearing officer recommended that petitioner be classified lA because 
his religious activities coincided with pressure from the draft Board. In 
his report to the Appeal Board, the Department of Justice adopted hearing 
officer's recommendation, relying on the timing of petitioner' 5 religious 
activities and !lhis abusi:v:·enesa ·and the exercise of physical violence toward 
his wife" and because petitioner had been .I!a rather heavy drinker and crap 
shooter in and around local taverns and pool halls. " 
Petitioner refused to submit to induction and this prosecution followed. 
On trial, petitioner claimed that he had not been afforded a fair hearing as 
required by the Act becaus e of the failure of the Department of Justice to 
furnish him with a fair resume of all adverse information in the FBI report 
in the files of the Department, and that this invalidated his lA classification 
and his conviction of refusing to subm.it to induction. 
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted writ of certiorari to 
review the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the 7th Circuit affirming 
defendant's conviction in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois. 
How should the Supreme Court of the United States rule and for what 
reasons? 
Question No.7: 
Applications for construction permits for standard broadcast stations 
were filed with the FCC, one by the Easton Publishing Company for Easton. 
Pennsylvania and the other by Allentown Broadcasting Corporation for 
Allentown, Pennsylvania. Both were for the same frequency, and, despite 
the fact that neither station would render service to the other community, 
simultaneous operation of the two stations would cause mutually distructive 
interference. 
The hearing examiner who conducted the hearings on the two applications 
recommended that the Allentown application be granted. Easton filed ex-
ceptions to that initial decision of the hearing examiner with the Commission, 
and after oral argument the Commission issued its final decision, disagreeing 
with this examiner and granting the station to Easton. 
The Commission made detailed findings of fact as to the qualifications 
of the applicants and the nature of the communities to be served. Most fac-
tors provided no basis for choosing between the applicants. Both were found 
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legally, technically, and otherwise qualified to become the licensee; both 
communities were equally in need of programs p r opos ed to be broadcast by 
each applicant. One differentiating factor however was that Allentown 
had three local stations whereas Easton only had one station. The Com-
mission recognized that Allentown was a city of almost triple the size of 
Easton and growing at a greater pace, but held that Easton's need for a 
choice between locally orginated programs was decisive. 
On judicial review of the Commission's award of the license the Allen-
town Broadcasting Company argued that the Commission's reversal of its 
hearing examiner was erroneous because the examiner's findings based on 
demeanor of a witness are not to be overruled by the board without a "very 
substantial preponderance in the testimony as recorded, " and that the Board 
only had authority to reverse an examiner's findings only when they are 
"clearly erroneous. It 
What disposition should the reviewing Court make of this contention of 
Allentown Broadcasting Company, and for what reasons? 
Question No.8: 
An employer, charged with violations of the wage stabilization provisions 
of the Defense Production Act of 1950 sought to enjoin administrative proceed-
ings to determine his guilt of the violations charged, alleging that: 
1. The conduct of the proposed administrative hearings would 
cause it irreparable damage by weakening its bank credit and 
- 11 -
depriving it of es sential working capital. 
2 . That the Act did not authorize such adminis-
'. 
trative action for tre enforcement of the wage stabiliza-
tion provisions. 
The employer pointed out that the conduct of the proposed administrative 
hearings would cause it irreparable damage by weakening its bank credit 
and thereby depriving it of essential working capital regardless of the 
outcome, because: (1) If the National Enforcement Commission should 
find a violation it would certify to all governmental agencies including the 
Internal Revenue Service for income tax purposes, the disallowance of all 
illegal wage payments found by it to have been made, which would disqualify 
such payments as a busines s expense for income tax purposes. The amount 
of excess wage payments involved ranged from $750,000 to $5, 500,000. 
(2) Its banks would be alerted to this possibility and would call their loans 
and refuse additional working capital loans. 
What disposition should the Court make of the case and for what reasons? 
Question No.9: 
The I drr..inistrative Procedure Act (5USC § 1001 etseq. ) applies to Post 
Office Depar tment Administrative procedures. 
The plaintiff operates a mail-order business in Hollywood, California 
under the fictitious name" Male Merchandise Mart", which was duly recorded 
with the state authorities. Her business is selling and distributing through 
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the mails "publications, pin-up pictures and novelties. " 
On March 1, 1954 the Solicitor for the Post Office Department issued a 
complaint against her, charging that she was carrying; en by means of the 
Post Office, a scheme for obtaining money for articles of an obscene character, 
and further charged that she was depositing in the mails information as to 
where such articles could be obtained, all in violation of 39 USC §§ 255 and 
259 (a), 18 USC § § 1342 and 1461.; 
On the same day on which the complaint is sued, the Deputy Postmaster 
General ordered the Postmaster at Los Angeles, California, to refuse to 
deliver mail addressed to petitioner at her business address. The order 
stated that a complaint of unlawful use of the mails had been filed, that a 
hearing would be held to establish whether there were any violations of the 
applicable statutes, and that the mail addressed to petitioner should be im-
pounded until further order. This order continued in effect, and was issued 
without notice or hearing. 
Petitioner answered the complaint and a hearing was held in Washington, 
D. C. in early March 1954. 
In the latter part of l'v1arch 1954, there having been no administrative 
adjudication as a result of the hearing, the matter being under advisement 
in the Post Office Department, the plaintiff filed an action for declaratory 
relief in the District Court for the Southern District of California. 
the 
Plaintiff sought a decree enjoining/interim impound order pending final 
administrative determination and pending judicial review of the validity of the 
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impound order. The plaintiff d i d not ask the Court to interfere in any 
way with the administrative proceeding which was being conducted. 
In her complaint the plaintiff complained only of the interim impound order 
under which her mail was being intercepted while the administrative proceed-
ing was being conducted. She complained that the interitn impound order 
was entered without notice, without a hearing, and without any authority 
in law, statutory or otherwise, and in violation of her constitutional rights 
under the First, Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Consti-
tution, and that she was being irreparably injured thereby. 
The statutes under which the Post Office Departme nt was created and 
under which it operated contained no specific authorization to the Post Office 
Department to impound mail without a hearing and before there had been any 
final determination of illegal activity. A bill was pending in Congress which 
would give such power to the Post Office Department with certain judicial 
safeguards. The Post Office Department argued that such power was neces-
sary for if an illicit busines s could continue while the administrative hear-
ings were underway, those who operated on a fly-by-night basis would be 
able to stay one jump ahead of the law. 
What is the proper scope of judicial review for the Court to afford on 
plaintiff's complaint, and for what reasons? 
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Question No. 10: 
Proceedings in which the Interstate Commerce Commission issued a 
certificate of public convenience for water carrier service were later 
reopened and the certificate amended to restrict operations thereunder 
to freightage. Subsequently the amended certificate was transferred, 
with Commission approval. The transferee accepted the modified cer-
tificate and operated thereunder for some years. He then filed with the 
Commission a petition for an interpretation of the amended certificate 
claiming the right to engage in both towing and freighting operations. 
He contended that such operations were permissab1e under the original 
certificate issued to his transferor, and that the Commission's amend-
ment of that ce .... -tificate restricting the operations thereunder to freightage 
was unauthorized under the circumstances of the '· case. 
The Commission issued an order interpreting the amended certificate 
to permit freightage only. Thereupon, the transferee filed a complaint 
in the District Court to have the order set aside. 
Should the District Court grant or refuse the relief sought and for what 
reasons? 
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